Floor V2 will introduce locking as a vital part of the Floor wars mechanic allowing for users to apply their voting power against the new collection and sweep wars. The underlying system works on epochs; a measurement of time that equates to one week. Tokens will be able to be locked for one of a number of predefined epoch amounts, relative to the max lock time. For example, if a max lock time was set to 2 years (104 epochs) then the options for this may be 4, 13, 26, 52, 78 and 104 epochs.
The duration of this lock reflects the vote power that is gained from staking. Locking tokens for the max lock will give 100% vote power, with the vote power being reduced proportionally to the lock duration. Following from the previous example, locking for 52 epochs would give 50% power, 13 epochs would give 12.5% power, etc.
If tokens are unstaked before the full duration, then a penalty will be applied with some of the staked tokens burnt. This penalty decreases as the lock duration shrinks.
This vote will allow us to gauge the community’s desired maximum lock time. Reducing the max lock time will allow for quicker access of staked tokens while maintaining higher voting power. The downside of this is that users can buy tokens to stake for just one or two important votes and then dump them back into a pool, meaning that there is less requirement for ongoing commitment and engagement with the protocol.
This vote will define the maximum lock time, with the other lock times being logically determined underneath it. This change is immutable and once defined cannot be changed.
The penalty amount for early exit will be determined in a separate vote once the max lock time has been decided.
- No Lock
- 2 Weeks
- 4 Weeks
- 12 Weeks
- 26 Weeks
- 52 Weeks
- 104 Weeks
- Amend (Please make a recommendation)
Lock Times Proposed
Vote Options for max lock time:
No locking mechanism
4 weeks (1 month)
12 weeks (3~ months)
26 weeks (6 months)
52 weeks (1 year)
104 weeks (2 years)
Amend vote (please make a recommendation)
Edit: Polling closes July 1 @ 12:00PM EDT
Following community feedback in the Discord I’ve reduced my preference from 2 years down to 6 months to allow the DAO to be aligned without the need for token holders to place excessive faith in the DAO’s path to decentralization.
Details on when this is going to snapshot?
Also what happens at the end of a lock period.
- Is a user required to unlock at the end of a period, then re-lock to be able to vote.
- Or rather, what I think it should be, a user locks and is able to vote. At the end of the lock period they can just keep their FLOOR staked and keep their voting power. If they ever decide to unlock some FLOOR and want to relock it later they must relock for the lock period. This way users dont need to continually unlock and relock their shit.
They would need to relock at the end of the period. Twade and I discussed that if the lock was sufficiently short enough (6 months or less) then it makes sense to keep the user’s vote power fixed at the maximum for the whole period.
For instance if the lock returned 1:1 vote power at a 6 month lock, then the user would retain 1:1 vote power until day 0 when the lock expires and they would need to relock. This would at least stop people having to relock during the 6 month period.
If the lock period was much shorter I think we should consider a TraderJoe style mechanism but this removes the early exit penalty (burning FLOOR). @Twade could chime in on what the gas would look like for relocking given, say, a 100 gwei gas price.
Once we have determined a realistic locking mech duration, I’ll be able to share realistic gas usage examples from across different lock periods (early withdraw / refreshing / etc.).
This area of the codebase was quite heavily focussed in gas optimisation, so hopefully it will be a pleasant surprise when it comes to cost of the calls. Definitely don’t want people having to pay daft amounts just to reclaim tokens or extend voting power.
How frequently have collections been added on average, and how do we see that evolving?
Say the average time between votes is X days, and the lockup is Y days. My thoughts are that, if someone wants to vote every time, they effectively have to multiply their holdings by Y/X.
I don’t really have thoughts on what the ideal is, but if Y is less than X, its not as impactful, as the amount locked up will basically always be at most the amount used in the last vote.
The current voting on new collections probably happens every 3-4 months on average I’d say. I’d also imagine this being the case moving forward too as we would want to own sufficient liquidity in our positions for efficient yield. This is just my opinion, and DAO votes could always open this up to be more regular.
There is the option to restake existing tokens, essentially retaining the tokens that are already staked but extending the unlock time to grant full power again. This is a gas efficient call too, so should be minimal cost.
Also it should be noted that Sweep Wars will take place every week, so the votes will still be utilisable outside of just new collection additions. Hope that helps
I voted with the amend option. My suggestion is 6.9 weeks
Please no vote decay stuff, id rather suck my fungus ridden toes than have to relock before each vote.
‘This change is immutable and once defined cannot be changed.’ You mean to say this vote sets the lock time and we cant change it later should the need arise ? Why is that? Shouldnt we be able to test this and modify lock length to increase/decrease or outright abolish it ?
This vote doesn’t set it, but the vote length that goes into the protocol is immutable. More discussion can be had before V2 lands on mainnet.